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nfl I!HE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of St. Louis has been, for the last three decades or so, at the center of an approach to macroeconomic policy which became universally known as "Monetarism." Indeed, the very term entered the public domain through an article in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' Review by Karl Brunner in 1988. The central tenet of monetarism was that there is a stable demand function for something called "money.' Policy advice came down to recommending that the monetary authorities should deliver a steady rate of the growth of money within some target range.
The 1970s were a good time for monetarists. Velocity in the United States appeared to be on a stable trend, and the adoption of floating exchange rates generated a need for independent measures of monetary stance in most of the industrial countries. Monetary targeting was widely adopted and monetarism became a worldwide credo. Since the end of the 1970s, however, life has been much harder for monetarists. The stability of empirical monetary relationships became much more difficult to maintain, and government after government has given up even the notional attempt to target monetary aggregates. The allegedly monetarist government of Margaret Thatcher abandoned monetary targets in the United Kingdom in 1985. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has recently announced that the Fed has ceased to monitor M2 and, instead, will be using the real interest rate as an indicator of monetary stance.
Only the Bundesbank appears to be retaining any faith in the significance of monetary aggregates, though they have been widely criticized for so doing. (Norbert Walter, the chief econo-
we do not, then what have we got, But a Quantity
Boulding (1969, p. 555) mist of Deutsche Bank, has, for example, been quoted as saying that "...M3, the broad money supply indicator targeted by the central bank, was obviously distorted and devalued as an indicator." Financial Times, August 10, 1993, p. 2).
The standard explanation for why previously stable monetary relationships have broken down is financial innovation. In particular, liberalization and competition in banking have generated shifts in demand between components of money which have undermined earlier empirical regularities. tnterest payments on transaction deposits have made it more difficult to distinguish money held for transaction from money held for savings.
Robert Rasche (1993) in his paper to the St. Louis Fed conference 12 months ago identified the beginning of the 1980s as a time of a critical regime change. This structural change, he claimed, had destroyed the validity of the traditional St. Louis reduced-form methodology as a means for explaining and forecasting the course of GNP. Policy makers around the world have clearly also been convinced that monetary aggregates provide little useful information to guide macro policy.
Presumably, nobody would argue that no guide to monetary policy was necessary. However, the advocates of a simplistic policy based upon any traditional measure of money as the sole guide are disappearing rapidly.
At the theoretical level, the significance of exogenous monetary shocks as a cause of business cycles has been under threat from the so-called Real Business Cycle school. For them, monetary disturbances are not the trigger to cycles but, rather, are an endogenous response to shocks emanating in the real economy. While this approach does not necessarily eliminate the validity of countercyclical monetary policy, it certainly reduces the significance of the traditional monetarist line that monetary shocks are the primary trigger to the cycle. Several recent empirical studies have apparently produced evidence to support the contention that money does not have any explanatory power-at least for real economic activity. (Dc Long and Summers, 1988; Kuttner, 1992, 1993.) The consensus view emerging from all of this appears to be that trying to target and control money is no longer a very sensible thing for policy makers to do. Monetary policy is now mainly about setting short-term interest rates, despite all the well-known difficulties that choosing the "correct" interest rate entails (Friedman, 1959) . This paper follows an alternative line of reasoning, for which there is an overwhelming theoretical case. There has been a major measurement error in virtually all of the previous literature on money. Instability in empirical relationships has been primarily due to the fact that simple-sum measures of money are not admissible aggregates on index-theoretic grounds. This error has been especially important in a period when characteristics of components which are added together have been changing.
We do not claim that correction of this measurement error salvages entirely the role of money as a macroeconomic indicator (though such may still be the case). Rather, our primary focus is to see whether acceptable indexes of money outperform traditional money measures in conventional tests. As is often the case in applied studies, the evidence turns out to be mixed but leaning in favor of the superiority of weighted over simple-sum aggregates.
Before presenting our own empirical evidence, we shall first review briefly the evolution of the concept of money and then the case for an appropriately constructed index.
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The definition of money has not been static over time. The first identifiable measure of money was undoubtedly the stock of the physical commodity which served as currencytypically precious metal. At some point, certainly by the isth century in England, it was clear that bank notes had become a major element of the money stock so that a monetarist at that time would have had to extend the definition of money to include notes plus specie in the hands of the public. By the 19th century, financial innovation had moved things a stage further and the relevant concept of money had expanded yet again to include bank deposits, which could be used on demand and could be transferred by writing a check.
In recent times, the issue has been: Which of the other highly liquid assets held by the public should be included? 'rhe Radcliffe view in the United Kingdom and the view of Gurley and Shaw in the United States was that the boundary between money and other liquid assets was impossible to draw because so many close substitutes were available. This contention was countered successfully for a while by the evidence that elasticities of substitution were relatively small (Chetty 1969) and also by the evidence that predictions of monetarist approaches were fairly robust to minor definitional changes. In other words, the general message of the evidence was not so different if one used Ml or M2, or even M3.
Such a defense would be much harder to maintain today than it was 15 years ago. The introduction of interest payments on checking accounts in the United States led to a major reversal of the velocity trend-at least for Ml in about 1980. In the United Kingdom, abolition of quantitative ceilings on bank intermediation, also in 1980, led to a period of rapidly rising broad money coinciding with very slow narrow money growth. The innovations which followed were clearly associated with big movements of deposits from non-interest bearing to interestbearing accounts. In such circumstance, neither narrow nor broad money proved to be reliable indicators-at least in the short term.
It would be a mistake to believe that the composition changes of the 1980s were a new phenomenon. In Volume I of A Treatise on Money, Keynes argued that an unchanged quantity of money could conceal important changes in circulation as holders transferred money bet ween cash and savings deposits, and between income and business accounts. In Volume II, he reported the statistical finding that the proportion of deposit (savings) accounts to total accounts had risen in Britain from 38 percent to 46 percent between 1920 and 1926. According to Keynes, ". -. The continual transference from current to deposit accounts ... [acted as) a concealed measure of deflation (Keynes, 193Db, p. 10) sufficient to explain a drop in the price level of 20 percent over the period.
There is nothing remarkable about the fact that these composition changes have been noticed before. What is remarkable is that so many economists were happy to ignore them for so long in the post-World War II period. Partly, this was because the regulatory regime in most countries (interest ceilings and/or quantitative controls on intermediation) limited for some time the significance of the interface between checking and savings accounts, as well as the significance of nonbank competitors.
A substantial amount of literature discusses the concept of money and its measurement (see Fisher, 1989 , Chapter 1, for a survey). At the risk of oversimplifying, it is sufficient for present purposes to note that the traditional reason for regarding money as critically different from other assets is that it has a direct role in transactions and, hence, has a direct role in the trading activity of a market economy. According to the Quantity Theory, the money stock will determine the general level of prices (at least in the long term) and, according to monetarists, it will influence real activity in the short run.
For this reason, empirical measures of the money stock have tried to identify as components of money those instruments which can be used directly in transactions. The problem of our time is that a whole range of types of deposits which can be spent, more or less, directly also yield an interest rate and could, thus, be chosen as a form of savings as well.
From a micro-demand perspective, it is hard to justify adding together assets which have different and varying yields (Barnett, Fisher and Serletis, 1992) . It has long been known that only things that are perfect substitutes can be combined as one commodity. There is ample evidence that the assets which are commonly combined in money measures are not in fact perfect substitutes.
From a micro-foundations perspective this leaves only two alternatives. The first is to restrict attention to a very narrow definition of money, which only needed non-interest bearing components. The alternative is to construct an index number of "monetary services" which could, in principle, capture the transactions services yielded by a wide range of financial assets in a superlative way (Diewert 1976 (Diewert , 1978 . Two potential index numbers are the Divisia index proposed by Barnett (1980) and the Currency Equivalent (CE) index proposed by Rotemberg (1991) at the St. Louis conference in 1989.
'The attraction of both of these monetary services indicators is that they internalize the substitution effects between components of a potential aggregate and, thus, solve the problem of composition changes which was discussed above. They do not in themselves guarantee the weak separability of any chosen aggregate, but they do approximate optimal aggregator functions for those collections of aggregates which have been found "admissible" on separability grounds (Belongia and Chalfant, 1989) .
The theoretical case for weighted monetary aggregates is ovem-whelming-at least to anyone with a training in microeconomics and/or index number theory. The only objection could be on the grounds that it does not make an improvement over flawed simple-sum aggregates in practice. There has been a significant accumulation of evidence, however, to suggest that Divisia aggregates outperform their simple-sum equivalents. For example, Barnett (1980) showed that some apparent shifts in money demand in the United States were removed when Divisia measures replaced simple sum. Barnett and Spindt (1979) showed the informational superiority of Divisia over simple-sum measures. Belongia and Chalfant (1989) find Divisia MIA to have superior informational content to other admissible aggregates. Barnett, Offenbacher and Spindt (1984) also find evidence for the superiority of Divisia. Further support is provided by Serletis (1988) . Lindsey and Spindt (1986) is one of the few papers which have looked at this comparison to come out against Divisia, though Fisher and Serletis (1989) is inconclusive.
Belongia (1993) has recently discovered that using weighted, as opposed to simple-sum, monetary aggregates alters significantly the conclusions that should have been reached by several recent influential studies. These studies have, on the whole, adduced evidence that money is not a "cause" of cycles in real activity. Hence, this suggests that the problems with tests of money in the economy in recent years may be more due to bad measurement theory rather than to an instability in the link between the true money and the economy. Rather than a problem associated with the Lucas Critique, it could instead be a problem stemming from the "Barnett Critique."
The idea of weighted monetary aggregates has spread outside the United States. Studies include Home and Martin (1989) for Australia; Cockerline and Murray (1981) and Hostland, Poloz and Storer (1987) for Canada; Ishida (1984) for Japan; Yue and Fluri (1991) for Switzerland; and Belongia and Chrystal (1991) and Drake and Chrystal (forthcoming) for the United Kingdom. A recent Bank of England study in the United Kingdom context concludes: "A Divisia measure of money appears to have some leading indicator properties for predicting both nominal output and inflation.. .a case can clearly be made for including Divisia in the range of indicators analyzed by the authorities when forming their judgments on monetary conditions." (Fisher, Hudson and Pradhan, 1993, p. 63) .
A variation on the traditional "closed economy" tests is provided by Chrystal and MacDonald (1993) . They point out that exchange rate models have been just as dependent upon money measures as have demand for money studies or reduced form tests of monetary policy. It is no coincidence that exchange rate equations started to misbehave at the same time as velocity trends appeared to shift (in the early 1980s), By replacing simple-sum aggregates in an exchange rate model by Divisia aggregates, for the dollarpound rate, they show that a simple, flexible, price monetary model can be salvaged as a long-run proposition-They also find that, when Divisia measures are used, the short-run forecasting performance is far superior on out-ofsample tests.
We now turn to some empirical results of our own. The results we shall present fall into two distinct sections. In the first section, we report comparisons of simple-sum and weighted measures of the money supply in the context of St. Louis Equations. The dependent variable is accordingly nominal GNP. We are aware of the problems encountered in the past with such methods (Rasche, 1993) . However, it is a simple, familiar and well-known context within which to compare money measures. We are not concerned with the absolute validity of the results but only with the relative performance of different measures. Non-nested testing techniques were used to distinguish between various indicators of money.
In the second section, we use the more sophisticated modern time-series methodology to test for the existence of short-run and long-run causal links between money and real activity. It is this latter question which has dominated the recent literature. We add to this literature both by including alternative money measures and by providing international comparisons. None of the data we used was original to this study. The bulk of it was made available to us by Michael Belongia at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, though the U.K. Divisia series (post-1977) was constructed by the Bank of England (Fisher, Hudson and Pradhan, 1993) . It should be noted that the time period of the study differs for each country, depending upon data availability. Data definitions also vary from country to country, but space does not permit an extensive discussion of such differences. Seasonally adjusted data were used in all cases.
The dependent variable is taken as the first difference of the log of nominal GDP or GNP. The first difference of the log of nominal government spending (federal in the United States case) on goods and services is used as a fiscal variable in all cases. A world trade variable was tested as an external demand variable but was not found to add explanatory power in the countries tested. Also tested was an interest rate variable. This was found to be important in this context only for the United States. Hence, the U.S. Equation includes the first difference of the Treasury bill rate.
The original St. Louis Equation contained lags of order 0-3. On quarterly data, most economists would expect to use at least 0-4, so, given the short data series for some countries, this is the standard lag length we adopted. The results are reported in Tables 1 to 7 for the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Japan, respectively. Let us consider each.
The U.S. results are summarized in Table 1 . Simple-sum aggregates Ml and MtA in general dominate their Divisia equivalents. From M2 onwards to broader aggregates, however, the domination is reversed. This is clear for M2 and M3, though the difference between Divisia L and simple-sum L is probably not significant. This general picture is not altered by the inclusion or exclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
From the F-tests it is clear that simple-sum MIA, Divisia M1A and Divisia Ml do not add significant explanatory power to the equation at normal significance levels. However, Divisia M2 has the greatest informational content of all the aggregates tested, though it is only marginally more significant than simple-sum MZThe CE aggregate holds its own against Ml and M1A, though never establishing statistically significant domination in either direction. It loses out to the broader simple-sum aggregates, however, and also to the broader-based Divisia measures (the latter result is implied but not shown) -Overall, the M2 level of money aggregation seems superior, though the Divisia aggregate at this level does not dominate its simple-sum equivalent sufficiently to make an overwhelming case for preferring one to the other.
On jted Kingdom
The U.K. results appear in Table 2 . There are far fewer aggregates to choose from in the U.K. case. The Bank of England even stopped report- ing Ml and M3 in 1989 because it considered the data too distorted by financial innovation. Hence, the only choice using official statistics is between MO (the monetary base) and M4. The results show a clear domination of Divisia M4 over simple-sum M4 both with and without the presence of lagged GDP. The non-nested tests, however, make it impossible to choose between Divisia M4 and MO. Also, while the Akaike Information Criterion favors MO over simple-sum M4, the J-test and the JA-test are inconclusive and indeterminate, respectively. On the other hand, the F-test gives informational advantage to MO, with Divisia M4 running second. SimpleResults for Australia appear in Table 3 . They show comparisons between M2, M3 and their Divisia equivalents. The information criterion is always in favor of Divisia, and the significant J-tests favor Divisia. More dramatic perhaps are the F-tests which show that neither simple-sum aggregate matters at anything close to normal probability levels, while both Divisia aggregates do have significant informational content. This is probably the clearest case available which IIlustrates the domination of Divisia over simplesum aggregates-especially for broad money measures. Table 4 contains the results for Germany. The information criterion generally favors IJivisia measures over their simple sum counterparts, with the exception of M3 in the absence of the lagged dependent variable. All the J-and JA-tests are indeterminate with the exception of the J-test which shows dominance of Divisia M2 over M2 Un the presence of the lagged dependent variable). The same test for M3 is very close to accepting Divisia M3 as dominating M3.
The overwhelming impression of the German results, however, is that conveyed by the F-tests, which show the very low informational content of all money measures. In this respect, only Divisia M3 is significant at even the 10 percent sum M4 has no significant explanatory power at normal probability levels. This suggests that Divisia M4 should replace simple-sum M4 as an indicator of the course of broad money in the United Kingdom. level and the simple-sum aggregates do not obviõ usly matter at all. This is a surprising result for a country which has a reputation for sound monetary policy and adheres to a simple-sum M3 target. It is possible that the very success of monetary policy is responsible for a low variation of nominal income growth, which makes it hard to establish statistical relationships. However, it is also possible that Divisia money measures do a better job in tracking nominal GDP than their simple-sum equivalents. 
flI LU! fit tIE fly ciUJSAL.'Ĩ n this part of the paper we consider Granger causality tests for a selection of Divisia and simple-sum money aggregates for each of the countries referred to in our st. Louis tests-The causality tests are based on vectors consisting of real GDP, the GOP deflator, a~~~asury bill rate and the relevant measure of the money supply. Defining our causality vectors in this way facilitates separate modelling of the effect that different monetary impulses may have particularW in the short run) on the real and price components of GDP-The Treasury bill rate is also included in the vector because of the we1l~knoWn spurious effect money can have on output if an interest rate effect is excluded (Sims, 1980 )-Our causality tests have a number of other features, some of which are novel to this paperFirst, for reasons which are now widely accepted~it is extremely important that the variables entering the causality vector should be 5~~~i onary and that any indication of cointegrat ability should be determined (see, Eiigle and Granget 1987; MacDonald and Kearney, 1987) . The latter aspect of the time~serie5properties of 1094 'rhe general class of causality tests employed in this section of the paper have come in for some criticism in the literature (see: Zellner, 1979 Zellner, , 1988 llasmann, 1963; and Cooley and LeRoy, 1985) . In particular, it is argued that to be interpreted as indicating causality from, say, money to output, Granger-type causality tests have to be embedded in a structural setting and appropriate identifying restrictions imposed (see Holmes and Hutton, 1992 , for a partial rebuttal). However, given our purpose is not to examine causality for a single measure of money, but rather to determine which measures from a we do not believe that the standard criticisms of our framework have as much import as they may have for more conventional studies. We also take encouragement from the fact that We begin the empirical analyses of this seceven in recent papers which only address the tion by testing for unit roots in the variables causality properties of a single money measure entering our causality vector. Although the coin-(see, for example, Friedman and Kuttner, 1993) , tegration method we employ below is due to Granger-type tests have still been employed Johansen and is, therefore, a multivariate test (although, we would argue, incorrectly since for the number of unit roots in a given vector, such tests only involve a vector of differenced we nevertheless thought it worthwhile to exavariables), mine some simple univariate unit root rests for motivational purposes, and also to guide us in the appropriate order of differencing for the variables entering the cointegrating tests.
There have been, in fact, a variety of proposed methods for implementing univariate unit roots tests (for example, Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Phillips and Perron, 1988; Stock, 1990; and Park and Choi, 1988) and each has been used in the applied macroeconomics literature. Since, however, there is now a growing consensus that the earliest, unit root test-due to Dickey and Fuller (1979) -has superior small sample properties compared to its competitors (see Campbell and Perron, 1991, for a discussion), we employ it. In particular, we estimate the following regression equation for the series entering our causality vector:
Ax~-+ where~is the variable of interest,~i and 'r denote deterministic regressors (a constant and a time trend, respectively). Equation 1 represents a reparameterization of an autoregression of x~in levels, where the length of the autoregression is set to ensure that u, Is serially uncorrelated. In this context, a test for a unit root in the series x amounts to a t-test of it 0 (that is, the sum of the autoregressive parameters in the levels autoregression is unity). The alternative hypothesis of stationarity requires that it be significantly negative. Since under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity the calculated t-ratio will not have a student's t-distribution, critical values calculated by Fuller (1976) must be used instead.
In estimating equation 1 for so many country/variable combinations, we initially used a common lag length, q, of 4 for all variables. However, given the sensitivity of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests to the chosen lag length we also experimented with shorter lag lengths in instances where the estimated f-ratio on ii-was close to its critical value, this being particularly so when a variable appeared to be 1(2) -(In particular, and following the recommendation of Hall, forthcoming, and Campbell and Perron, 1991, we sequentially deleted insignificant lags of the dependent variable until we arrived at a parsimonious relationship which satisfied the non-autocorrelation criterion.) In the reported tables that follow, a shorter lag length than 4 is denoted by the number in parenthesis after the variable mnemonic. Where the default value of 4 is reported for the ADF statistic, it means that either all four lags are significant or, in instances where some lags are insignificant, reducing the lag length from 4 would not have made a qualitative difference to the interpretation.
In Tables 8 through 14 , we present our estimates of the f-ratio for the estimated coefficient it in equation 1 for the levels and first and second differences of each series in question. This procedure facilitates a test for one and two unit roots, respectively. The f-ratio has been calculated with the time trend included in the regression equation, as in equation 1 (referred to as and the trend excluded (referred to as t). This follows the sequential testing strategy recommended by, for example, Perron (1988) : If a deterministic component is excluded from a unit root test but such a component features in the data generation process (DGP) of the series, the resulting test will have low power. However, if the deterministic component is absent from the DGP, greater power may be obtained by estimating p without the trend component. In our unit root tests, all variables, apart from the interest rate series, have been transformed into natural logarithms. In order to capture any remaining seasonality in the variables, three seasonal dummies have been incorporated into our estimated version of equation 1.
A number of findings emerge from Tables 8  to 14 . First, there are only two variables which appear to be stationary around a deterministic trend, namely the Australian Treasury bill rate and the Rotemberg Currency Equivalent measure -all the other variables appear to contain stochastic trends. As is common in many other studies of the time series properties of macroeconomic series, the level of the price deflator for a number of countries appears to be an 1(2) process; that is, inflation in these countries is an 1(1) process. Interestingly, it is also the case that some of our monetary series appear to be 1(2) processes. tn general we found that this result (but not the result for the deflator) was particularly sensitive to the lag length specified in the estimated equation.
For example, in the case of the United States, all of the simple-sum money measures appeared to be 1(2) when q was set equal to 4 (DM1A and DM1 also appeared 1(2) with four lags). However, in these instances it appeared that this lag length resulted in an overparameterized regression equation and the deletion of a single lag Note-See Table 8 . Nate: See Table 8 . Note See Table 8 made a dramatic difference to the estimated tratio on it (without significantly affecting the non-autocorrelatedness properties of the residuals). Indeed, with three lags all of the money measures with the exception of simple-sum MS (SSM3) and simple-sum L (SSL) appear to be 1W; the former variable appears 1(1) when q= 1, while SSL appears 1(2) at all lag lengths (again, the residuals in each of these cases were nonautocorrelated) -
The country with the greatest preponderence of monetary aggregates being 1(2) is Canada, in which six out of the eight chosen monetary aggregates appear to have two unit roots, The finding that the level of a country's price series is an 1(2) process finds confirmation in a number of other empirical studies (see, for example, Johansen and Juselius, 1990). Furthermore, the finding that monetary aggregates are 1(2) has also been reported by other researchers (Rasche, 1993) , although this finding does not appear to be as robust as that for price deflators,
We now turn to an analysis of the cointegralion properties of a vector of variables for each of our chosen countries. In particular, for each country we use the methods of Johansen (1988, 1991) to estimate the number of cointegrating vectors in y' = km, gdp, dc]', tb], where m denotes the money supply, x is either ss (for simple-sum) or d (for Divisia), gdp is real output, clef is the deflator corresponding to output, and rb denotes the relevant interest rate (usually a Treasury bill rate). The fact that the variables entering y' may for any one country be a mix of 1(1) and 1(2) processes has to be taken into account in our implementation of the Johansen procedure, since the latter is only appropriate for 1(1) variables and driftless 1W) variables. We therefore use the information from our unit root tests to reduce the order of integration of any 1(2) variables to 1(1), by entering the first difference of the level of such a variable. Thus, if a country's price level is 1(1), we enter the change in the price level (equivalent to the inflation rate, since the price level is transformed logarithmically) and/or if the money measure is also 1(2), it is also entered in differences.
In the context of estimating a conventional money demand function (which has the same 'Dynamic steady-state equilibrium simply involves the addition of a term in the constant vector of steady-state growth rates to equation 2, which we omit here for expositional purposes; this does not affect the subsequent discussion.
set of variables as are contained in our y vector), Johansen (1991) has suggested dealing with the two unit roots in m and p by respecifying the y vector to consist of (m-p), y, i and 4.
However, given the nature of the current exercise, and also since, in many instances it is only p that appears to be 1(2), we do not believe that such a specification is as attractive as the one adopted here. To determine the number of unit roots in y' we use the following method, due to Johansen (1988 Johansen ( , 1991 . This method may be thought of as the multivariate equivalent of (1). It is assumed that y, has the following autoregressive representation with Gaussian errors (2) Johansen (1988, 1991) has proposed a maximum likelihood method of estimating all of the cointegrating vectors contained in H and significance tests to determine how many of the vectors are statistically significant. Since the Johansen technique is now well-known, we do not present it here. Instead, we simply note the two test statistics used to determine the number of significant cointegrating vectorsIn our application the likelihood ratio, or trace, test statistic (LR1), for the hypothesis that there are at most r distinct cointegrating vectors, is
where A,,,,...,A~are then -i-smallest squared canonical correlations between the y,~and lAy, corrected for the effect of the lagged differences of the y, process (for details of how to extract the A, 's, see Johansen 1988) . Additionally, the likelihood ratio statistic for testing at most r cointegrating vectors against the alternative of r + 1 cointegrating vectors is given by equation 4 (6)LR2 = T!n (1-A,,) . Johansen (1988) shows that equations S and 6 have a non-standard distribution under the null hypothesis. He does, however, provide approximate critical values for the statistic, generated by Monte Carlo methods. (The critical values recorded in Johansen's 1988 paper are for a VAR without an intercept term or seasonal dummies. Since these were included in our empirical analysis, we used the critical values for 5 and 6 reported in Johansen and Juselius, 1990.) In Table 15 , our estimated values of LRI1 and LR2 are presented, and the critical values and relevant null hypothesis are reported at the bottom of the table. Consider first the results for the United States. Interestingly, there is no evidence of cointegration for any of the narrow monetary measures (i.e. Ml and M1A). However, with the exception of 55M3, there is clear evidence of one unique cointegrating vector for all monetary measures which are broader than Ml. It follows from this that it is the introduction of these broader monetary measures that produces a cointegrating set (and not the income, interest rate or inflation rate). Since the Rotemberg currency equivalent measure appears to be stationary around a deterministic trend, it would appear not to be an ideal candidate for the Johansen methodology. However, for completeness, and also since it is often difficult to discriminate between a variable which is stationary around a trend and one which has a stochastic unit root, we also test for the numbers of cointegrating vectors in a y vector defined for RCE. Interestingly, this also gives strong evidence of one cointegrating vector, as does the BCE measure. (BCE is a variety of currency equivalence which uses Divisia weights.) The evidence for other (non-U.S.) countries in Table 15 is also suggestive of there being long-run relationships contained in different specifications of the y vectors: The vast majority of monetary measures produce at least one cointegrating vector and many produce two. Again, there does not appear to be any split between Divisia and simple-sum monetary measures in terms of the production of cointegrating relationships.
The broad picture to emerge from Table 15 is that there is strong evidence of at least one cointegrating vector for most country/money combinations. It also seems that, at least in this long-run modelling context, there is no sharp distinction between Divisia and simple-sum money. It may be, however, that one or other monetary measures produce more sensible" estimates of the cointegrating vector and we return to this point in a later section (where we also examine sample specific issues which may be important for the United States). However, for the implementation of our causality tests, the main implication to be drawn from Table 15 is that a causality relationship specified simply in differences will be misspecified for the vast majority of country/money combinations. We therefore propose estimating the vector error correction models implied by our coin tegration results and subjecting them to exclusion tests on the lags of each of the differenced (either first or second differenced, depending on the outcome of the results reported in Tables 8 to 14) and also on the lagged cointegrating terms. Since we correct the coefficient variance-covariance matrix for heteroskedasticity (using the methods of Hansen, 1980; and White, 1978) , the exclusion tests are performed using linear Wald statistics, our initial di-,c us'ion cml the lcing-t nn irnpac Note-See Table 16 .
there is a clear differential impact. For example, in terms of the output equation, the Divisia monetary measure is significant at the 5 percent level in three cases (namely, DM2, DL and RCE1) and at the 7 percent level in two instances (that of DM3 and BCE1), but none of the simple-sum money terms enters significantly even at the 10 percent level. It is also interesting to note that among the two currency equivalent measures, it is only the RCE measure which features significantly in the real output equation (confirming the significant influence for this monetary measure noted by Belongia, 1993) . The significance of these Divisia measures is repeated in the deflator equations (apart from RCEI, although, additionally, DMIA is also significant), although in these equations one of the simple-sum measures is also significant (for SSMIA). With respect to monetary causality in the United States, TB equations, both simple sum and Divisia seem to do equally well in that each measure has significant strikes.
The U.K. evidence, reported in Table 17 , contrasts sharply with that for Switzerland. Neither M4 nor Divisia M4 affects real GNP. However, Divisia M4 does influence the inflation rate. Both money measures influence interest rates. Thus, the superiority of Divisia M4 over M4 is confirmed (at least so far as inflation is concerned), but the lack of causality from money to real activity is noteworthy.
The Australian results, recorded in Table 18 , differ from the U.S. results in that the TB rate does not have a significant short-run influence in any of the real output equations or in the price equations. However, in common with the U.S. results, Divisia money is significant-both M2 and M3-in the real output equation, whereas the simple-sum measures are not. In contrast, however, it is the simple-sum measures which have a significant short-run impact in the TB equations rather than the Divisia measures. There are also significant long-run influences in all of the equations, although these do not seem to be confined to any particular measure of money.
For Germany, none of the monetary impulses -neither Divisia nor simple-sum-appears with a significant influence in the real output equations, although there would appear to be an interest rate effect in this equation for the two sum measures of money. Real GDP has a significant influence in all of the money equations, apart from SSM2. The joint effect of the TB rate is significant in all of the money equations and inflation, in turn, has a significant impact on interest rates.
Both simple-sum and Divisia monetary measures have also a significant influence on inflation and the TB rate in the Swiss case (Table  20) , although in contrast to the German case both Divisia measures appear significant in the output equation, as does SSM1. In common with a number of other countries, the TB rate has a statistical influence in all of the output equations and in three of the money equations. It is noteworthy that the joint effect of inflation is statistically significant in three out of four of the output equations.
The Canadian results (Table 21 ) portray little significant impact of money on any variable (the exceptions being 55M3 and DM3 in the TB equation). Interest rates also do not have the same significant role to play as they did in the U.S. case for real output, although they do feature in the majority of money equations. The effects of price (or, more correctly, inflation) feature prominently in almost all of the TB equations.
The Japanese causality pattern (reported in Table 22 ) is in many ways similar to that for Germany. Thus, neither simple-sum nor Divisia money enters significantly into the output equation, although there is a significant impact of both types of money in the inflation and TB equations. The TB rate also features significantly in all of the Japanese real output equations but, in contrast to the German case, only enters significantly into one other equation (apart from its own lags)-that for DM3. The causality results reported in the previous section are for the longest span of data for which consistent simple-sum and Divisia data are available for each country. Within each country-specific data sample, there may be one or two changes in the way monetary policy has been implemented. Thus, some countries have switched from targeting one particular aggregate to another or have switched from monetary targeting to interest rate targeting, or vice versa. Therefore, it is of interest to inquire if the results reported in the previous section carry through for sub-samples corresponding to specific monetary regimes. One of the possible examples of a regime change arises in the United States around 1980, when a combination of reforms (including a change in Fed operating procedure and a liberalization of deposit markets) produced an apparent shift in previously stable monetary relationships (Rasche 1993) . Given this, and also since the U.S. data sample is one of the longest, we concentrate our subsample tests on our U.S. data set. In particular, we have re-estimated our U.S. causality tests for the first quarter of 1960 to the third quarter of 1979 (lags being generated within this sample).
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In Table 23 , the estimated Trace and Amax statistics are reported for our chosen U.S. subsample. In contrast to the full sample results, it is noteworthy that all of the monetary measures produce at least one cointegrating vector (for the full sample, none of the Ml monetary measures produced any cointegrating vectors). We therefore use the information concerning the number of cointegrating vectors to set up appropriate VECMs for each monetary measure. The sub-sample exclusion tests based upon these VECMs are reported in Table 24 . The broad conclusion to emerge from this table is, perhaps not surprisingly, that the sub-sample produces a very different picture with respect to the relative merits of simple-sum and Divisia money. More specifically, we note that the significant impact of money in the real output equations occurs for the narrow Ml measures of money and not for the broader measures (and, in terms of the Ml measures, simple sum seems to outperform Divisia since two of the sum measures are significant at the 5 percent level against one Divisia measure at this significance level) -Of the two currency equivalent measures, BCE is insignificant in the GDP equation, while BCE is significant (albeit at the 6 percent level of significance) the reverse of our findings for the full sample. Other notable features of the sub-sample results, which are dis- 
